In this paper we apply a simple two-period model of investment to examine how consideration of the real options associated with investment decisions might be expected to affect the cost of capital for telecommunications infrastructure firms in light of the tumultuous changes associated with the emergence of the Internet. Because investments in new telecommunications facilities also may provide access to additional growth opportunities (e.g., to enter new information service markets) or strategic flexibility ( e.g., enhanced ability to respond to changing traffic demand patterns), these investments may also create valuable options. Therefore application of contemporary investment theory to estimating the cost of capital for telecommunications firms should consider the impact of changes in technology, the regulatory environment, and the structure of the telecommunications infrastructure industry in order to assess the relative magnitude of competing investment options. We explain why we believe the Internet and the changes it is bringing to the communications infrastructure industries is reducing the value of the option to delay while increasing the value of the options associated with increased growth opportunities and strategic flexibility.
I. Introduction
Most investment decisions, especially those associated with long-lived capital, are not fully reversible. Moreover, in the face of uncertainty, it is often p ossible to delay investments until more information can be obtained. Traditional neoclassical investment theory which assumes investments are perfectly reversible ( i.e., capital stocks may be adjusted upwards or downwards without friction) ignores these effects of uncertainty. Dixit and Pindyck (1994) illustrate how traditional interpretations of neoclassical capital theory can underestimate the cost of capital for irreversible investments because it fails to account for the value of the call option to invest at a later date that is extinguished once the investment occurs ("delay option").
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In some of the extreme examples they cite (e.g., perfect irreversibility and no costs associated with delay), a revised estimate of the cost of capital that properly accounts for the option to delay may be twice as large as an estimate based on a traditional net present value (NPV) analysis that ignored the delay option.
Accepted at face value, this result has profound implications for how one estimates the cost of capital for capital-intensive firms, and for the valuation of these firms. In the context of infrastructure firms subject to price regulation ( i.e., telecommunications, electric power transmission, natural gas pipelines, etc.), the theory of real options raises important questions for how policymakers ought to estimate the cost of capital used to assure that the firm has the opportunity to earn a fair return on its invested capital and faces appropriate incentives for continued investment. If the cost of capital is set too low, then firms will fail to recover their investment, leaving them with "stranded plant." Conversely, if the cost of capital is set too high, then the regulated firm may be able to extract surplus profits from consumers or competitors.
For the contemporary telecommunications industry in the United States, the need to establish an appropriate cost of capital for local telephone infrastructure owned by the Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers (ILECs, e.g., Bell Atlantic, BellSouth, etc.) became newly important 1 See also Trigeorgis (1996) , who emphasizes the options created by new investment. <<This Draft: December 3, 1999>>
Page 3 with the passage of the Telecommunications Act of 1996. 2 This Act required the ILECs to unbundle their networks and make the network elements available to competitors at "cost-based rates." Failure to estimate correctly the cost of capital for telecommunications infrastructure would have obvious perverse implications for investment incentives and the prospects for the emergence of effective competition.
In the context of U.S. regulatory policy, we trace the debate over the application of real options theory to estimating the cost of capital for telecommunications infrastructure firms to a submission to the FCC by Hausman (1996) . In that submission, Hausman argued that because telecommunications investments are largely irreversible, proper consideration of the real options theory and the call option to delay, should lead to substantially higher estimates in the cost of capital than those produced using a traditional neoclassical approach to investment theory.
Hausman's argument made use of an example presented in Dixit and Pindyck (1994) . The policy debate over this issue has continued. 3 While we disagree with Hausman's original arguments (see Hubbard and Lehr, 1996) , we agree that the theory of real options has important implications for pricing investments in telecommunications assets. We believe the original debate focused too narrowly on the likely magnitude of any error associated with failure to account for the "delay option" and that a more general framework is needed to understand how this theory might best be applied in the context of the telecommunications industry. Specifically, while investment today may extinguish the value of the delay option, it also creates options to adjust one's capital flexibly in the future.
In this paper we present a simple two-period model developed by Abel, Dixit, Eberly, and Pindyck (hereafter "ADEP (1996) "), to explore the impact of the options to flexibly adjust capital that are created when investment occurs. We then interpret this model in light of the changes in the telecommunications industry implied by and associated with the emergence of the Internet. We explain why we think these changes are likely to enhance the value of embedded 2 See Federal Communications Commission (1996) or Hubbard and Lehr (1998) for further discussion of Telecommunications Act of 1996. <<This Draft: December 3, 1999>> Page 4 investments in telecommunications infrastructure, thereby leading t o a reduction in estimates of the appropriate cost of capital.
In Section II of the paper, we describe the basic ADEP (1996) model and discusses some of its limitations in the context of a full understanding of the implications of real options on cost of c apital and firm valuation estimates. Section III applies the model to the case of telecommunications firms in light of the emergence of the Internet. Section IV provides conclusions and directions for future research.
II. Real Options and the Valuation of Firms
Abel, Dixit, Eberly and Pindyck (ADEP, 1996) present a two-period model of investment decisions that provides a useful framework for examining the implications of applying real options theory to the question of valuing telecommunications assets. Before introducing the model, it is worthwhile reiterating a point that is sometimes misunderstood by those unfamiliar with the cost of capital literature and the impact of real options theory. Traditional neoclassical capital theory properly incorporates expected changes in the value of capital assets associated with depreciation and changes in the relative price of capital assets. The traditional Jorgensonian user cost of capital, u, is given by (ignoring taxes)
where r is the risk-adjusted discount rate, δ is the expected rate of depreciation, λ is the expected rate of change in the relative price of capital goods, and b is the current purchase price for a unit of capital (relative to the price of output).
Naïve applications of this theory that neglect to account properly for expected price declines in the relative price of capital assets ( e.g., because of productivity-enhancing innovations embodied in new capital) will systematically underestimate the user cost of capital if capital prices are falling over time ( i.e., treating λ as if equal to 0 when in fact λ<0). In telecommunications, failure to account properly for expected declines in the price of capital goods is likely to have a substantial impact. Biglaiser and Riordan (1999) , for example, examine the impact on rate of return and price cap regulation of properly accounting for predictable reductions in capital equipment prices and operating costs.
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In this paper, we abstract from the effects of predictable depreciation and price declines, assuming that δ=λ=0, in order to focus attention on the impact of uncertainty and factors that may influence how uncertainty affects the valuation of telecommunications firms in light of the growth of the Internet. In the first sub-section, we present the basic ADEP model. We then discuss limitations of the present model in our setting and how it might be extended in a more general dynamic context.
A. Two-Period Framework of ADEP (1996)
ADEP (1996) present a simple two-period model of investment under uncertainty that allows easy consideration of when investment is neither fully reversible nor irreversible. In their framework, the firm faces costly expandability (wherein the future purchase price of capital may exceed its current price) and costly reversibility (wherein the future resale price may be less than its current purchase price).
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Firms make an investment decision in the first period, yielding a certain return. Second-period returns on invested capital are stochastic, affecting both the return on capital invested in the first period and the decision to purchase or sell capital in the second <<This Draft: December 3, 1999>> Page 6 period. The value of a firm, then consists of the value of its assets in place (first-period capital) and the value of options to purchase or sell capital in the second period. These same "real" options will affect the user cost of capital conventionally used to analyze the firm's investment decision.
More formally, the firm's investment can be described as follows: In the first period the firm purchases and installs K 1 units of capital at a unit cost of b. This investment yields a return of r(K 1 ), where r(K 1 ) is increasing and concave in capital. The return on capital in the second period is stochastic and is given by R(K,e), where e is stochastic. In particular, R K (K,e) is continuous and strictly increasing in e (and continuous and strictly decreasing in K). The firm adjusts capital in the second period to a new level, K 2 (e), which may be greater than, equal to, or less than K 1 .
Ignoring for the moment any options associated with adjusting the level of capital in the second period, the value of the firm in the first period would be equal to the expected present value of the net cash flow from the first-period investment of K 1 , or:
where γ is the firm's discount factor (i.e., one divided by one plus the appropriate risk-adjusted discount rate for the firm).
To explore the firm's investment decision in this case, note that the firm chooses K 1 to maximize (V(K 1 )-bK 1 ). We can characterize the firm's desired capital stock using either the "marginal q" or "user cost of capital" expressions conventionally used in neoclassical investment models (see, e.g., Hassett and Hubbard, 1999) . The first-order condition for the capital stock yields the familiar marginal-q expression:
Therefore, the Jorgensonian user cost of capital, u, is given by
That is, abstracting from depreciation, the user cost of first-period capital is the financial opportunity cost of using the capital, approximately, rb.
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As the large body of research on real options points out, these conventional valuation and investment expressions abstract from potentially important options associated with decisions about expandability and reversibility.
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One obvious extension is to focus on the call option associated with delaying an investment which increases the hurdle rate for investment and the extinguishing of which reduces the firm's value as noted above. As noted above and as we explain further below, this call option of delay may be less valuable while the put option to resell --or more generally, to put to other use invested capital --may be more valuable for telecommunications infrastructure because of changes associated with the emergence of the Internet. Taken together, these effects would tend to lower the estimated cost of capital and increase firm valuation relative to traditional neoclassical theory.
The ADEP (1996) framework can be used to illustrate these option values straightforwardly. For simplicity, assume that the firm faces a first-period purchase price of capital of b; in the second period, capital may be acquired at a unit cost of b H or sold at a unit cost of b L . When b>b L , investment is characterized by costly reversibility (the often-used case of complete irreversibility implies that b L ≤0).
11
When b H >b, investment is characterized by costly expandability (as b H ->∞, no expandability is possible). The conventional neoclassical benchmark implicitly assumes that b L =b =b H .
When investment is characterized by both costly reversibility and costly expandability, the expected present value of net cash flow accruing to the firm with capital stock K 1 in the first where K 2 (e) is the firm's capital in the second period, and e L and e H are threshold values for the second-period profitability disturbance, e, that warrant resale or purchase of capital in the second period, respectively.
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The first two terms are just the traditional neoclassical net present value of expected returns. The last two terms are new and include the value of the options to adjust capital. The third term is the expected value of the put option to sell capital while the last term is the expected value of the call option to buy additional capital. For example, the value of the put option is the expected present value of the revenue from selling capital (K 2 -K 1 ) at price b L less the foregone returns that would have been earned had capital not been reduced.
The threshold values of e L and e H are determined by the marginal conditions, The sale price b L may be less than zero in the event of costly disposability (e.g., hazardous waste from a nuclear power plant).
12 The profitability disturbance, e, is distributed with cumulative probability distribution F(e) with −∞≤e≤+∞ and with E(e)=0 and variance σ e 2 .
conditions that emerge from the firm's optimal investment decision in the second period.
13 When e is less than e L , the marginal productivity of capital is less than the resale price and the firm will sell or redeploy its capital so K 2 (e)<K 1 . When e is greater than e H , the marginal productivity of capital will exceed its purchase price and the firm will acquire additional capital and K 2 (e)>K 1 .
For intermediate values of e between e L and e H , the firm will keep its capital constant so K 2 (e)=K 1 . This formulation assumes that the future resale price for older capital will always be less than the future purchase price for new capital (i.e., b L <b H ).
14 Combining terms in Equation 5 and rearranging terms, we have: In contrast to the formulation in Equation 2, the valuation expressed by Equation 6, has three regions of values for the second-period returns. For low values of future profitability (−∞ < e < e L ), the firm sells or redeploys capital, netting a cash flow in the second period of {R(K 2 (e),e)+b L (K 1 -K 2 (e))}. For intermediate values of the profitability disturbance (e L < e < e H ), the firm neither acquires nor sells capital, and the second-period cash flow is R(K 1 ,e). For high 13 These results follow naturally from solving the first-order necessary conditions associated with the firm's optimal investment decision in the second period:
where terms represent payoffs to firm if it sells capital, keeps capital the same, or increases capital in the second period. <<This Draft: December 3, 1999>>
Page 10 values of future profitability (e H < e < +∞), the firm acquires additional capital and the secondperiod cash flow is {R(K 2 (e),e)-b H (K 2 (e)-K1)}.
In this more general case, the investment rule implicit in the expression for marginal q is given by:
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Equation 7
In contrast to the neoclassical expression in Equation 4, the augmented user cost of capital is given by: We can also explicitly incorporate option valuations into the investment threshold ("marginal q") and the valuation ("average q") expressions. Rewriting Equation 7) as:
where we have expressed "marginal q" as the sum of three components:
The first is the familiar NPV of marginal returns on the first period capital stock, K 1 . The second is the value of the marginal put option, P'(K 1 ), an increment to marginal q. The third is the value of the marginal call option, C'(K 1 ), a decrement to marginal q. The optimality condition for the choice of the first-period capital stock remains q(K 1 )=b, so that:
Equation 11
That is, again, the investment threshold is affected by the marginal put and call option values.
Average put and call option values also affect the value of the firm. Note that Equation 5 may be rewritten as follows: The first term is the familiar expression for the expected present value of returns on K 1 .
The second term is the value of the put option to redeploy capital in the second period at a unit price of b L . Finally, the third term is the value of the call option to acquire capital in the second period at a unit price of b H .
As with the user cost of capital and marginal q, the values for the embedded put and call options affect the value of the firm. When the put option of resale or redeployment is relatively more important, the true value of the firm exceeds the conventional NPV valuation. In the oftendiscussed case in which the call option is relatively more important, the true valuation is less than the conventional NPV valuation. The extreme case of perfect irreversibility assumed by Hausman (1996) corresponds to b L =0 ( i.e., no resale value, so that the put option may be ignored).
The underlying parameters of the model affect the option values, the user cost of firstperiod investment, and the value of the firm in intuitive ways 15 . We might imagine that b H and b L may both move in the same or opposite directions and may move different amounts relative to b, 15 It is also possible that the shock e is an industry disturbance, raising both b L and b H . In this case, as long as there is an important idiosyncratic component to e, the marginal q is defined by: It is also possible to consider the impact of changes in the distribution of profitability shocks, F(e). For example, a reduction in σ e 2 would reduce the value of both options while a symmetric increase in σ e 2 would increase the value of both options. This latter effect could occur if the something happened to cause F(e) to have fatter tails. If F(e) changes asymmetrically so that the lefthand tail is fatter, then the put option (resale) becomes more valuable; while a shift that makes the righthand tail f atter increases the value of the call option (purchase new capital).
These effects are summarized in Table 1 .
B. More General Dynamic Framework
The foregoing analysis helps explain the roles that option values associated with expandability and reversibility p lay in investment decisions and valuation. While the analysis is somewhat limited by the two-period structure, many of the intuitive results carry over to the more general dynamic formulations of the investment and valuation problems. In general, the expectation that the purchase and sale price of capital will increase and decrease, respectively, in the future influences current investment decisions and valuations ( e.g., see Dixit and Pindyck, 1998). Option valuation techniques can be used to calibrate the magnitude of these effects.
One can also use this intuition to describe the consequences of "first-mover advantage"
for investment and valuation. When first-mover advantages are important, expected first-period profitability rises for the first mover, reducing the initial user cost of capital (as in Equation 8 for the two-period case) and increasing initial value (as in Equation 12 for the two-period case for <<This Draft: December 3, 1999>>
Page 14 the first mover). Subsequent entrants face lower profitability and, for a given cost of expandability, a higher first period cost of capital.
More generally, these effects follow the broad outline of the two-period example. When costs of additional capacity are expected to rise rapidly because of entry or expansion by other firms, current investment thresholds are reduced (through reduction of the call option value), and the value of the firm rises. When resale prices are expected to fall in the future, the value of the put option declines, increasing the user cost and reducing the valuation.
The context of telecommunications and Internet firms is particularly interesting in this regard. On the one hand, the important first-mover advantage (e.g., arising from positive network externalities) for such firms implies a high cost of expandability. On the other hand, the usefulness of current investments for a wide range of future technologies and products implies that one can think of declines in resale or redeployment values as being modest, or even negligible. For example, newly available technologies are increasing the marginal value of conduit and first-stage investments. That is, the cost of putting wire in the ground has not fallen as dramatically as the cost of technologies that may be used to expand the capacity of the installed wire (e.g., xDSL or DWDM). Such technologies make expansion of the existing capital less expensive.
In the context of the model presented earlier, the first-mover advantages reduce the call option value in Equation 6; the high flexibility in redeploying capital increases the put option value in Equation 6. Both effects act to reduce the required return on equity and increase valuations relative to those obtained using traditional NPV methods. The Internet illustrates both effects well -making network infrastructure investment more reversible, while making the risk of not having adequate capacity greater if capacity is costly to obtain. The option to use capacity installed initially is more valuable, and the value to redeployment or selling capacity if not used for its originally installed purpose also rises. We discuss additional applications of the model to telecommunications in the following section.
III. Real Options and the Cost of Capital for Telecommunications and Internet Firms
The telecommunications industry has been subject to several important forces for a number of years. Rapid innovation has resulted in substantial productivity gains which translates into rapid economic depreciation and continuing declines in the price for capital ( i.e., λ<0 in reality). In addition, the capabilities of the technology have expanded substantially, allowing providers to offer a wider range of services. The technologies have also become more modular, permitting capacity to be added in smaller increments, thereby reducing economic entry barriers.
In light of these changes, policy-makers have begun to remove regulatory entry barriers. The
Telecommunications Act of 1996 represented an important step in this direction. Its chief goal was to eliminate both economic and regulatory entry barriers to competition in local telephone services that in most markets remains a de facto monopoly.
The Internet accentuates these trends. Because the Internet is based on open standards
that facilitate the flexible interconnection of heterogeneous equipment ( i.e., assure interoperability), it helps lower the costs of constructing and maintaining a network.
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In terms of the example we presented, the future price of capital, b H , is reduced, which increases the value of the delay call option.
Internet technology also makes networks more flexible. Because the Internet shifts network intelligence to the edges of the network, it makes it easier to upgrade the technology or offer new services. With traditional telecommunications networks based on hierarchical systems, the introduction of new services requires modifications to network components both within the core of the network and at the periphery, which increases both the coordination and the direct costs of making a change. ; while telephone networks can be used to provide data and video services ( e.g., Internet access and soon Internet broadcasting).
Although there have been other technologies for supporting mixed multimedia services over alternative local access infrastructure ( e.g., ATM for supporting multimedia over telephone networks, or voice-over-data technologies for carrying telephone calls over cable television networks), the wide adoption of the Internet protocols and their flexibility make them an ideal spanning layer to provide technology-blind connectivity across multiple physical network platforms and to allow physical infrastructure to provide application-blind transport to a multiplicity of traffic types. This development allows investors in transport infrastructure to decouple their decision to invest in underlying transport from a forecast of the demand for a specific application. The universe of potential applications that can be supported on the physical infrastructure is expanded. In terms of our model, convergence in this sense increases b L and initial firm value because the range of end-user service markets that can be served by physical infrastructure is increased. For example, with the growth of the Internet and interest in broadband access, and with the development of xDSL technologies to support broadband 18 See Kavassalis and Lehr (1998) for a more complete explication of these ideas.
services over copper local loop plant, the value of the underlying copper infrastructure is increased (i.e., b L is increased).
Second, the growth of the Internet has helped blur industry boundaries. The markets for computer and network equipment are merging as traditional distinctions between data and telecommunications disappear. The resulting increased competition helps lower equipment costs, especially for the electronic network components used to switch traffic. Meanwhile, the costs of installing outside plant have not fallen as rapidly. It is still quite costly to dig up streets and install new wires, especially in built-up urban areas. This may have the effect of increasing b H (increased call option) and increasing b L (increased put option).
Third, the growth of the Internet is facilitating the convergence of media so that consumers will be able to take advantage of mixed interactive video, voice, and data services.
Although these services are still not widespread, it is anticipated that service providers will want to supply and consumers will want to buy integrated mixed-media services. This will substantially increase the demand for bandwidth required in the backbone and the periphery of the network. Furthermore, because data traffic is inherently more heterogeneous ( i.e., more bursty with a higher peak to average bandwidth), this will further enhance the need for network capacity.
20
Anticipation of this substantial growth in demand for capacity for all electronic communications services again enhances the value of existing infrastructure, especially for local loop plant (b L increased).
Finally, the growth of electronic commerce over the Internet is further enhancing the need for and demand for reliable broadband communication services. All of these forces further increase the mission-critical nature of electronic communication networks and make end-users less price sensitive in aggregate. As data communications and the Internet become more entrenched and impact more aspects of day-to-day business functions, the risk of not controlling one's network facilities may encourage self-provisioning of networks.
The overall effect of these trends is likely to make all levels within the communications infrastructure value-chain more competitive and to accelerate the pace of innovation. This effect will increase overall uncertainty for firms that compete in cyberspace. In terms of the model presented earlier, σ e 2 will increase, increasing the value of both the put and call options, with a possibly ambiguous effect on the cost of capital and the value of most Internet firms. For example, increased competition upstream or downstream will tend to increase the put option and decrease the call option, making a firm in a protected niche more valuable. Because at this stage in the industries development, no one is precisely sure where protected niches might be, this may have the effect of increasing the put option for capital at all levels (a fatter left tail to the profitability shock distribution). That is, if every firm thinks that in the future it will need to have an electronic-commerce presence on the Web to survive (i.e., failure means loss of quasi-rents as well as extinquishing of future profit options), this could increase the value of assets necessary to sustaining a Web presence (e.g., in addition to basic network infrastructure, all of the application support such as security, billing, Web design, etc.).
In addition, because of first-mover effects, whichever firm is lucky enough to establish itself in what turns out to be a very valuable protected niche may earn extremely high returns.
Formally, one may think of this as increasing the expected value of the upper tail of the profitability shock distribution ( i.e., higher probability of a very high return while keeping the total probability that e e xceeds e H unchanged). The opportunity to capture the first-mover advantage in such a case is analogous to holding a lottery ticket that promises a small chance to win a very big prize; while the risk of hold-up discussed above is like having a very large penalty associated with not having bought any lottery ticket. When coupled together, these effects may help account for the extremely high valuations we are seeing for some Internet firms. For example, Amazon.com may be on its way to establishing itself as "the retailer on the Net" (firstmover advantage). However, to the extent that no bookseller or publisher can afford to ignore having a Web presence, this increases the value of Amazon's competition as well. A similar effect may help explain the value of Web portals such as Yahoo.com.
While investment to meet these needs is occurring at all levels within the telecommunications network, local access facilities remain an important potential bottleneck. 
IV. Conclusions and Extensions
In this paper, we apply the simple two-period investment model of Abel, Dixit, Eberly and Pindyck (ADEP, 1996) to explore the implications of incorporating real options into estimates of the cost of capital and the value of firms in the telecommunications and Internet industries. The theory of real options helps highlight important errors that may arise in the face of uncertain investment that is costly to adjust ex post. Prior research in this area in the context of telecommunications firms (e.g., Hausman, 1996, or Hubbard and Lehr, 1996) focused solely on the relative value of the option to delay investment (the call option) that is extinguished when a partially or completely irreversible investment is made. Failure to account for this delay option leads to underestimates of the cost of capital and overestimates of firm value. This approach neglects the valuable resale (put) option that is created by the investment. That is, while it may be possible to delay investment today in order to learn whether investment is really desirable, delay may force the firm t o miss an industry bandwagon or forgo a first-mover advantage.
Investing early may increase future flexibility. Whether the cost of capital should be higher (and firm value lower) or the reverse depends on which of the options is more important.
After explaining the model in section II, we suggest how we think the Internet is likely to have affected the value of the real options associated with the capital assets of telecommunications infrastructure providers and Internet firms in general. Our comments in this regard are preliminary and based on our assessment of current trends. We are extending the current analysis both in developing a more robust dynamic theoretical model and, more important, attempting to validate our intuitive assessments of the impact of the Internet empirically.
Two extensions of the framework considered here appear particularly promising. First, the integration of option values in the user cost of capital and firm valuation suggests that one may want to explore the extent to which familiar methods for estimating required rates of return for telecommunications firms incorporate these options elements. Second, the potential importance of first-mover advantage in telecommunications and Internet markets points up the potential relevance of a dynamic extension of the model presented here.
Previous analysis of the real option component of the required rate of return for telecommunications firms has focused on the consequences of the call option of delay associated with irreversible investment for the required rate of return (see, e.g., Hausman, 1996; Biglaiser and Riordan, 1998; and Salinger, 1998) . These examples generally emphasize complete irreversibility, so that the "put option" of sale or redeployment of technological investments does not affect the user cost of capital or the value of the firm. At the same time, costs of delay are not usually considered. The DCF approach would produce an estimate of γ*. Higher values of the call option reduces the estimate of γ* (i.e., increasing the estimated required rate of return). In addition, a high value of the call option relative to the put option reduces the firm's value and leads to a higher estimated return on equity than in a traditional DCF analysis of the required rate of return.
Higher values of the put option increases the estimate of γ*; the higher resulting valuation of the firm is associated with a lower DCF estimate of the return on equity.
Second, extension of the framework to a dynamic setting to study effects of first-mover advantage on firm value is likely to be fruitful. Loosely speaking, such an extension would incorporate heterogeneity in the distribution of future returns depending upon order of entry. As we noted in section III above, the presence of a significant first-mover advantage reduces the option value of delay for a potential first mover. 
